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WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL
REMEDIES, AND NELSON V. COLORADO
Michael L. Wells*
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s Nelson v. Colorado1
opinion, in which the Court addressed the novel issue of constitutional
remedies for persons wrongly convicted of crimes. Governments routinely
deprive criminal defendants of both liberty and property and do so before
giving them a chance to appeal their convictions and sentences.2 In addition
to imprisoning convicted individuals, the state often imposes charges on
them, in the form of court fees, probation supervision fees, fines, and
restitution.3 When a conviction is overturned, the state typically refunds
these monetary exactions but seldom compensates for the loss of liberty.4
In Nelson, the Supreme Court addressed an unusual case in which the state
did not return the money.5 The Colorado Supreme Court held that a Colorado
statute called the Exoneration Act6 provided the sole avenue for obtaining a
refund.7 Under that statute:
* Professor of Law and Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and Insurance Law,
University of Georgia School of Law. The author wishes to thank Dan Coenen, Jonathan
Nash, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments on a draft. This Article was prepared for the
Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting Civil
Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on
October 27, 2017, at Fordham University School of Law.
1. 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).
2. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1(a)(1) (2017) (“[E]xcept in cases in which life
imprisonment, life without parole or the death penalty may be imposed, . . . the judge . . . shall
prescribe a determinate sentence”); id. § 17-10-9 (instructing on the procedure for calculating
a sentence where the defendant “has been incarcerated pending the prosecution of an appeal
to any court”); id. § 17-11-1 (“If convicted, judgment may be entered against the defendant
for all costs accruing in the committing and trial courts and by any officer pending the
prosecution.”).
3. See generally Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price,
NPR (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-feespunish-the-poor [https://perma.cc/MTK2-DDQX] (describing the trend of increasing fees
associated with a criminal prosecution).
4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1262 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4103(a)
(2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-73 (2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.35(4) (McKinney 2018);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.008(A) (West 2017); see also David G. Post, Nelson v.
Colorado: New Life for an Old Idea?, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207–09.
5. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1252.
6. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-65-101, 13-65-102, 13-65-103 (2017), invalidated by Nelson
v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).
7. People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1071 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1249.
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a person who has been convicted of a felony . . . and sentenced to a term of
incarceration as a result of that conviction and has served all or part of such
sentence . . . may be eligible for compensation . . . upon a finding that the
person was actually innocent of the crime for which he or she was
convicted.8

The statute went on to state that, in the event the claim is contested by the
state, “the burden shall be on the petitioner to show by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she is actually innocent of all crimes that are the subject
of the petition, and that he or she is eligible to receive compensation pursuant
to this article.”9 With only Justice Thomas dissenting, the Court held that
Colorado’s Exoneration Act offended the Fourteenth Amendment because it
deprived the plaintiff Shannon Nelson, who had obtained reversal of her
conviction on appeal, of property without due process of law.10
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court focuses largely on how to apply
the procedural due process test established in the case of Mathews v.
Eldridge,11 under which determining the process that is due depends on a
balancing of interests.12 Applying Mathews, the Nelson Court held that the
state of “Colorado’s scheme fails due process measurement because
defendants’ interest in regaining their funds is high, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of those funds under the Exoneration Act is unacceptable, and
the State has shown no countervailing interests in retaining the amounts in
question.”13 Notably, and in keeping with the general practice of the states,
the Court also appeared to recognize a basic distinction between
compensating defendants for loss of property and for loss of liberty.14
The end result in Nelson will satisfy nearly everyone’s sense of basic
justice, at least insofar as the monetary refund is concerned. Still, the case is
interesting not for its outcome but because the Court’s analysis touches on,
but fails to fully engage with, subtle and difficult questions of constitutional
law.
This Article examines three important aspects of the case—outside of the
procedural due process balancing question—that receive little, if any,
attention in the Court’s opinion. Part I shows that the Court’s procedural due
process analysis skips over the logical first step and doctrinally harder
question of whether Nelson had a constitutionally protected property interest
once Colorado took the money pursuant to her conviction. On this point,
Justice Ginsburg seems to set aside the Court’s previously settled doctrine
about the nature and source of property protected by the Due Process
Clause.15 Instead, the Court opts for an ad hoc definition of property, perhaps

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-102(1)(a).
Id. § 102(6)(b).
Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257–58.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 348.
Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257–58.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1257–58.
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because application of the settled doctrine may have allowed Colorado to
keep the money, a result which seven Justices very much wanted to avoid.16
Part II argues that the Court could have and should have taken a different
analytical pathway toward the outcome it reached. In particular, Part II
describes a rationale for reversal that would have resulted in return of the
money without sowing confusion in Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. This
analysis hinges on the rules governing Supreme Court review of state court
judgments. Ordinarily, the Court will not examine the state law grounds for
a state court’s decision in such cases.17 An exception to this rule exists,
however, for cases in which the relied-upon state law undermines federal
rights and lacks fair support in prior state law.18 The Supreme Court could
readily have found that the Colorado court’s interpretation of the Exoneration
Act met the requirements of this exception, thus allowing the Court to reverse
the lower court’s judgment without relying upon a new and controversial
notion of the meaning of property.
Part III turns to the Court’s distinction between deprivations of property
and liberty. Nelson holds that “[t]o comport with due process, a State may
not impose anything more than minimal procedures on the refund of
exactions dependent upon a conviction subsequently invalidated.”19 Some
of Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning strongly suggests that there is no due process
right to obtain redress for the lost liberty.20 Yet the Fourteenth Amendment
seems to draw no such distinction between liberty and property.21 It
guarantees “due process” when the state deprives a person of “life, liberty, or
property.”22 Part III asks whether there are grounds upon which a backwardlooking money-damages remedy can be justified for the deprivation of
property alone, or whether the liberty/property distinction is simply an
arbitrary one.
I. PROPERTY AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Shannon Nelson was convicted of physically and sexually abusing her
children.23 She paid restitution and court costs and served prison time while
her appeal was pending.24 After obtaining reversal of her conviction, she
won an acquittal on retrial.25 But when Nelson sought restoration of the
money she had paid the state during her trial and incarceration, Colorado
officials refused her request.26 The state maintained, and the Colorado
Supreme Court agreed,27 that the Exoneration Act provided the sole means
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See discussion infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1258.
See, e.g., id. at 1257.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id.
Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1079 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1249.
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to obtain a refund.28 Nelson and Louis Madden—the defendant in a
companion case decided in the same opinion—were not entitled to
restoration, as they had not attempted to meet the requirements of the
Colorado statute.29
With only Justice Thomas dissenting, the Court held that Colorado had to
refund the money notwithstanding Nelson’s failure to comply with the
Exoneration Act.30 Justice Ginsburg set forth both the issue and the holding
at the beginning of the opinion and stated, “When a criminal conviction is
invalidated by a reviewing court and no retrial will occur, is the State obliged
to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon,
and as a consequence of, the conviction? Our answer is yes.”31 Justice
Ginsburg dismissed the Exoneration Act as a constitutionally insufficient
remedy.32 As she put the key point, by limiting relief to persons convicted
of felonies, and by requiring a defendant to “prove her innocence by clear
and convincing evidence to obtain the refund,” the scheme could “not
comport with due process.”33
The problem with the Nelson Court’s reasoning is that it equates
Fourteenth Amendment property with common law property. The difficulty
with this interpretive move is that it overlooks well-settled Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine.34 When the issue is procedural due process, as the
Court said it was in Nelson, the Court usually declines to equate Fourteenth
Amendment and common law notions of property.35 And this difference, had
it been recognized, might well have dictated a different result in Nelson.
This Part first addresses the difference between common law property and
property as conceived by Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. It then goes
on to discuss the Nelson decision in light of this jurisprudence.
A. The Pre-Nelson Distinction Between Common Law
and Fourteenth Amendment Property
Justice Ginsburg seemingly took it as self-evident that the money at issue
in Nelson was property for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.36 Indeed, the
only point in the opinion where she touched on the issue at all was in applying
the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, a test which typically does not
come into play at all unless the Court first finds that a deprivation of property
(or life or liberty) has occurred.37 The Mathews test requires balancing “[t]he
28. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1253.
29. Id. at 1257.
30. Id. at 1257–58.
31. Id. at 1252.
32. Id. at 1255.
33. Id.
34. See infra Part I.A.
35. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005) (stating that
the determination of whether a Fourteenth Amendment property interest exists, “despite its
state-law underpinnings, is ultimately one of federal constitutional law”).
36. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257.
37. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 756 (“The procedural component of the Due Process Clause
does not protect everything that might be described as a ‘benefit.’”).
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private interest affected[,] . . . the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
through the procedures used[,] and . . . the governmental interest at stake.”38
In analyzing the first element of the Mathews test, the Nelson Court
observed that persons such as Nelson “have an obvious interest in regaining
the money they paid to Colorado.”39 Under the Court’s precedents, however,
it is not at all “obvious” that the state deprived Nelson of her “property” in a
constitutionally relevant sense. The Court has not ordinarily defined
“property” by reference to ordinary language and conventional
understandings and instead finds that the word may be broader or narrower
than its use in everyday language depending on the context under which the
property issue arises.40
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth41 is the Supreme Court’s
leading case on the nature and content of “property” as used in the Due
Process Clause. The plaintiff in Roth was a teacher on a one-year contract at
a public college who claimed that he was entitled to due process in connection
with nonrenewal.42 The general issue raised by the case was whether, and
under what circumstances, a variety of government benefits would qualify as
property entitled to due process protection.43 Building on recent theorizing
on what was becoming known as “new property” claims,44 the Court declared
that “the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well
beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”45 In particular:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person . . . must . . . have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution
of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined . . . . Property
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law.46

Under this framework, the test for whether a person holds a property
interest in a benefit is whether the person has a “legitimate claim of
entitlement” under state or federal statutory or common law to getting or

38. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1255.
39. Id. Although the Court does not address the issue of whether state sovereign immunity
blocks a judicial order instructing it to refund the money, the holding clearly, if implicitly,
rejects the defense. Space constraints preclude a thorough analysis of this issue. One possible
basis for rejection of sovereign immunity in this context is that the state has waived immunity
by initiating criminal prosecution and exacting the money in the course of the prosecution. See
generally Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (holding that
that a state may wave its sovereign immunity by its conduct in litigation).
40. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA.
L. REV. 885 (2000).
41. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
42. Id. at 566–67.
43. Id.; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 52 CORNELL L.
REV. 405, 436–37 (1977).
44. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 918.
45. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571–72.
46. Id. at 577.
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keeping that benefit.47 For example, it is settled that an employee who may
only be fired “for cause” holds a property interest in the job.48 By contrast,
the plaintiff in Roth was a college teacher on a one-year contract.49 He thus
had no property interest in his job because he had no “legitimate” expectation
of keeping it under applicable state law rules.50 Accordingly, he was not
entitled to a due process hearing in connection with his nonrenewal.51
The Exoneration Act aside, there were grounds for finding that Nelson had
a state-created property interest in restoration of the money she paid. Citing
Toland v. Strohl,52 Nelson’s brief to the Court asserted that, before the
Colorado Supreme Court’s construction of the Exoneration Act, the general
practice was to refund money upon reversal of a conviction.53 The state’s
brief acknowledged the practice but disputed its generality.54 As an example,
the state pointed to the case of People v. Noel,55 where the Colorado Court
of Appeals held that money paid for probation supervision services would
not be refunded.56 The state also identified cases beyond Noel in which
refund claims were rejected, though most of these authorities were dated and
came from other jurisdictions.57 In any event, the identified exceptions to
refund availability would not undermine Nelson’s “property” claim. The key
issue was whether the exceptions were wide ranging enough to justify a
finding that restoration is simply a matter within the discretion of state
officers and thus not a property right at all.
Relevant considerations in determining the content of state-created
property include not only the formal law but also widespread practices. In
Perry v. Sindermann,58 decided the same day as Roth, another college teacher
named Sindermann, also on a one-year contract and summarily denied a
renewal, had more success than Roth.59 In Roth’s case, “the terms of [his]
appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next
year.”60 Nor was there any “state statute or University rule or policy that
secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to
it.”61 By contrast, Sindermann had alleged that he could show that “the
college had a de facto tenure program, and that he had tenure under that

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928–29 (1997).
Roth, 408 U.S. at 566–67.
Id. at 578–79.
Id.
364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961).
Brief for Petitioners at 2–3, Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) (No. 15-1256).
Brief for Respondent at 15, Nelson, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (No. 15-1256).
134 P.3d 484 (Colo. App. 2005).
Id. at 485–86.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 18–22.
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Id. at 594–95.
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
Id.
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program.”62 The general principle underlying the Sindermann holding is that
property can be created by “the existence of rules and understandings.”63
In the decades after Roth and Sindermann, courts have recognized statecreated property interests in a variety of government benefits and jobs.64
Still, it is clear that Fourteenth Amendment property does not include benefits
that are only available at the discretion of government authorities.65 That
principle proved decisive in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,66 where a
woman sought police intervention after her former husband came to her home
in violation of a protective order she had obtained against him.67 Ultimately,
after her pleas were ignored, her former husband kidnapped and murdered
her children.68 Despite the language in the order that seemed to mandate
police intervention, the Court rejected the property claim, noting that “[a]
well established tradition of police discretion has long co-existed with
apparently mandatory arrest statutes.”69
The application of these principles to Nelson’s case is unclear. The statecreated property approach was not litigated in Nelson.70 In fact, it was not
even mentioned by the Supreme Court.71 The general practice throughout
the nation for a long time and in Colorado before this case, or at least before
Colorado’s enactment of the Exoneration Act in 2013, lent support to the
notion that a property interest generated by state law did exist.72 In the
Nelson opinion, Justice Ginsburg herself noted that “[p]rior to the
Exoneration Act, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized the competence of
courts, upon reversal of a conviction, to order the refund of monetary
exactions imposed on a defendant solely by reason of the conviction.”73 But
none of this seems to matter—or at least to matter much—in applying the
principles of Roth and Sindermann. Instead, for the Nelson Court, the
decisive issue concerned the impact of the Exoneration Act, since it set forth
controlling state law at the time the alleged deprivation of Nelson’s property
occurred.74
Put simply, federal law does not oblige states to recognize any particular
set of property interests, at least for the protection provided by procedural
62. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 600.
63. Id. at 602.
64. See, e.g., SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 111–12 (4th ed. 2015)
(collecting cases).
65. See infra notes 66–69.
66. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
67. Id. at 751–54.
68. Id. at 754.
69. Id. at 760.
70. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 53; Brief for Respondent, supra note
54.
71. See generally Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).
72. See id. at 1254 n.5 (citing Toland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961)); see also N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 60.35(4) (McKinney 2018) (“Any person who has paid a mandatory surcharge,
sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, a crime victim assistance fee or a
supplemental sex offender victim fee under the authority of this section based upon a
conviction that is subsequently reversed . . . shall be entitled to a refund.”).
73. Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1254 n.5 (2017) (citing Strohl, 364 P.2d at 588).
74. Id. at 1255.
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due process.75 A state may both opt against creating a property right in a
particular benefit and decline to continue to create property in a given
benefit.76 Although a state cannot eliminate property rights that already exist,
it may, for example, stop issuing new employment contracts that create an
expectation of continued employment or decline to renew a business license
when its term expires.77 Under this principle, the Exoneration Act seemed to
present an insurmountable hurdle for Nelson and Madden. By its terms, it
limited recovery to persons convicted of felonies and required the applicant
to prove innocence by clear and convincing evidence.78 These provisions
seem to eliminate any legitimate expectation of recovery for costs related to
misdemeanor convictions and for criminal defendants who obtain reversal
but cannot meet the clear and convincing test. And, due to the timing of the
relevant proceedings, Nelson had no basis for reliance on the previously
available refund practice. As construed by the Colorado Supreme Court, the
Exoneration Act provided the sole means available to obtain compensation
for wrongful convictions.79 It thus seems entirely sensible to say that any
property interest that Nelson had was hemmed in by the requirements of the
Act, a process with which she had not even attempted to comply.
B. Property Under Nelson
In Nelson, both the Colorado Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court
ignored the Roth framework.80 Justice Ginsburg’s approach may simply
echo the history of the Nelson litigation in the Colorado courts, although a
remand on the property issue would seem to have been the more appropriate
response. An alternative explanation for bypassing Roth is that the majority
recognized that under the Roth test, the Exoneration Act would oblige a
finding of no property and no refund—a result it wished to avoid. On this
view, seven Justices were determined to see to it that Nelson and Madden
received refunds despite the Exoneration Act. With that goal in mind, the
Court came up with an ad hoc approach to the property question, a move
reminiscent of other instances in which the Court has issued “inconsistent
pronouncements” as to “the meaning of property under federal law.”81
The Court in Nelson did not acknowledge its departure from Roth.82 It
also did not suggest in any way that it was intentionally endorsing an
alternative to the Roth test.83 As a result, one has to sift through the language
75. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 920–22 (describing the Court’s “positivist” approach).
76. See, e.g., Price v. Bd. of Educ., 755 F.3d 605, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2014).
77. See, e.g., id.; see also Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 603 (6th Cir. 2001)
(business licenses).
78. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-102 (2017).
79. See People v. Madden, 364 P.3d 866, 870 (Colo. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Nelson v.
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017); People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 2015), rev’d,
137 S. Ct. 1249.
80. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1254 n.5. See generally Madden, 364 P.3d 866; Nelson, 362
P.3d 1070.
81. Merrill, supra note 40, at 889.
82. See generally Nelson, 137 S. Ct. 1249.
83. Id.
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of the opinion to find clues as to what, in substance, the Court was doing.
Bits and pieces of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion suggest that the property
interest she had in mind reflected a common sense, intuitive notion of
“property.”84 On this view, everyone knows that the money in a person’s
pocket or bank account, if legally obtained, is that person’s property. Thus,
the starting point was Nelson’s uncontested ownership of the money before
her conviction. In other words, the case concerned “the continuing
deprivation of property after a conviction has been reversed.”85 Nelson thus
sought “to get [her] money back”86 because she had an “interest in regaining
[her] funds.”87 In turn, with the conviction overturned, “the State . . . has
zero claim of right”88 to the funds. In short, when Colorado took the money
pursuant to Nelson’s conviction, the state obtained only a defeasible interest
in it. Once the conviction had been overturned, Colorado’s basis for taking
the money had disappeared, leaving Nelson as the only other stakeholder.
The presumption of innocence bolstered the reasoning. Between the
moment of her conviction and its eventual reversal, Nelson retained the
presumption of innocence, itself a constitutional limit on the state’s power.89
Nelson and Madden, according to Justice Ginsburg, ended up in the same
position as someone who was never convicted at all because “once [the]
convictions were erased, the presumption of their innocence was restored.”90
The state of Colorado asserted that the now-invalid conviction allowed the
state to keep the money.91 But the State of “Colorado may not presume a
person, adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty enough for monetary
exactions.”92
This line of reasoning tracked what Professor Thomas Merrill has called a
“natural-property strategy,” under which “the Constitution is a compact
designed to protect certain rights of property that self-evidently belong to all
persons.”93 Though some might say that those convicted of criminal charges
are different from other persons, the presumption of innocence cuts sharply
against the notion that Nelson, once her conviction was reversed, was
differently situated from anyone else. Thus, there was a taking of her
property because concluding otherwise would not be “natural.” Notably, this
approach veered sharply away from Roth by diminishing—in a sweeping
way—the role of state statutes in defining Fourteenth Amendment
84. Id. at 1255–57.
85. Id. at 1255 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 1256 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; see also, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368
(1970) (striking down a New York Family Court finding of guilt against a juvenile defendant
where the state court’s procedure failed to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every
element of a crime).
90. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1255.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1256.
93. Merrill, supra note 40, at 943. Merrill introduces the idea for the purpose of a
thorough analysis of alternatives, not as a description of the Court’s doctrine or as a
recommendation. Id. at 942–44.
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property.94 In effect, according to Justice Ginsburg, Colorado’s Exoneration
Act was irrelevant as to the existence and scope of any property interest.95
That statute is merely the state’s procedure for obtaining relief, not a
mechanism redefining property.96 And, as such, the procedure failed to meet
the test of the Due Process Clause.97
As Professor Merrill notes, a natural-property model ignores the Court’s
own doctrine on the content of property for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.98 In addition, “[I]t is far from clear that it would be coherent
or desirable to speak of a set of core property rights protected directly by the
Constitution itself. The basic problem is that property seems always to entail
a large component of positive regulation.”99 As for the property right
recognized in Nelson, the practical significance of these objections depends
on future developments.
The lack of a sharp split among the Justices—as well as the absence of any
overt questioning of Roth—suggests that Nelson’s conception of property
was offered as a case-specific alternative to Roth’s state-law-based
approach.100 The generally conservative composition of the current Court
makes it unlikely that the Roth doctrine will be threatened any time soon by
Nelson. The likely explanation for Justice Ginsburg’s approach in Nelson is
that the Court defined “property” on an ad hoc basis for the sake of getting
the desired result in that one case. The problems raised by a general “natural
rights” approach do not arise so long as the Nelson doctrine can be cabined
by tying it to the narrow circumstances of invalidated criminal convictions.
But the ruling will probably disrupt current practice even if the Court
manages to confine Nelson’s conception of property to that context. Even in
the invalidated-conviction context, there may be good reasons to deny a
refund in some circumstances, but those reasons may not be good enough to
overcome a doctrine based on the Due Process Clause. For example, in

94. See supra Part I.A.
95. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1255 (“Because no further criminal process is implicated,
Mathews ‘provides the relevant inquiry.’”).
96. See id.
97. Aside from the natural rights element, this reasoning echoes that of Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Loudermill established that “[t]he
categories of substance and procedure are distinct” and that “‘[p]roperty’ cannot be defined
by the procedures provided for its deprivation.” Id. at 541. Perhaps the Court’s opinion in
Nelson is meant to be an application of the Loudermill principle. Under this view, the
Exoneration Act is merely a procedure for obtaining restoration rather than a substantive limit
on the property rights of persons convicted after its enactment. One problem with this view
of Nelson, however, is that the Court’s opinion does not develop its thesis. Another is that the
Exoneration Act’s terms both expand recovery (to include compensation for time spent in
prison) and puts limits on recovery (to persons who are convicted of felonies, sentenced to
imprisonment, and have served part of the sentence of imprisonment). See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-65-103 (2017). These features, along with the imposition of a “clear and convincing
proof of innocence” burden on the claimant, seem better characterized as the articulation of a
substantive right rather than as a procedure for the accurate resolution of traditional
restoration-after-reversal cases like Nelson’s.
98. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 943–44.
99. Id. at 944.
100. See supra Part I.A.
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People v. Noel,101 a conviction was vacated after the defendant had paid a
$630 probation-supervision fee.102 The Colorado Court of Appeals declined
to order a refund, mainly “because the purpose of probation is primarily
rehabilitative, and because defendant could have benefited from the
supervisory services she received and paid for.”103 For many of us, that
reasoning makes sense. Yet Nelson’s due process rationale may not allow
for such a distinction because the constitutional presumption of innocence
applied to Noel no less than it applied to Nelson. For Nelson and Madden,
“once [their] convictions were erased, the presumption of innocence was
restored.”104 At that point, “Colorado has no interest in withholding from
Nelson and Madden money to which the State currently has zero claim of
right.”105
In coming years, courts will face potentially thorny issues as to the scope
of Nelson: Does it apply to a case like Noel? Perhaps not, because the state
has contributed something of value to Noel. Would it apply to a case in which
an admittedly guilty defendant obtains release on account of admission of
evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule? Are there
any limits on its application?106
II. SUPREME COURT REVIEW AND THE “ADEQUATE
AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUND” DOCTRINE
Justice Ginsburg’s ad hoc treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment raises
a question: Could the Court have offered an alternative, and more
convincing, justification for the outcome? As it turns out, the Court had a
doctrinal route to providing a refund to Nelson without ignoring its settled
rules on the content of “property” protected by the Due Process Clause. This
analytical pathway involves navigating some esoteric features of Supreme
Court doctrine on the proper scope of its review of state court judgments.
Under a core principle of this field of law, referred to as the “adequate and
independent state ground” doctrine, the Court routinely refuses to examine
state law grounds for a state court’s decision.107
The adequate and independent state ground doctrine may have influenced
the petitioners’ litigating strategy in Nelson. The Court took the Colorado
Supreme Court’s state law ruling as a given, and thus did not challenge the

101. 134 P.3d 484 (Colo. App. 2005).
102. Id. at 485.
103. Id. at 487; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 20–22 (discussing a variety
of equitable considerations courts from a variety of jurisdictions have advanced in declining
refunds).
104. Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017).
105. Id. at 1257.
106. The Nelson Court does seem to leave the issue open, if only by rejecting the notion
that there were any equitable considerations on Colorado’s side of these particular cases. See
id.
107. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989) (“This Court long has held that it will
not consider an issue of federal law on direct review from a judgment of a state court if that
judgment rests on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal
claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.”).
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Colorado court’s interpretation of the Exoneration Act.108 But there is an
exception to the general rule of nonreview of state law grounds of decision,
and this exception would have provided a viable rationale for reversing the
Colorado Supreme Court.109 Although this issue was not briefed or argued
by the parties, it could be that the Colorado court misread the Exoneration
Act by treating it as providing the sole basis for recovery of money by persons
such as Nelson.110 On this better view, the Act was not meant to operate in
this way and would have instead provided a property right to restoration of
Nelson’s payments under a straightforward application of the traditional Roth
test.
This Part begins with a discussion of the development of the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine and the Supreme Court decisions that have
helped to shape its application and exceptions. It then discusses how this
understanding of the doctrine could have applied in the Nelson case to better
align the decision with the Supreme Court’s prior property jurisprudence
without disturbing the outcome for the plaintiff.
A. The Adequate and Independent State Ground Doctrine
From the perspective of Supreme Court review of state court judgments, a
key feature in Nelson was that the Colorado court ruled that the state’s
Exoneration Act provided the sole means by which Nelson and Madden
could make a claim to recover any money.111 Many cases that come to the
Supreme Court from state courts include both state and federal issues.112 But
the Court does not ordinarily review the state law issues.113 The Judiciary
Act of 1789 explicitly limited Supreme Court review to federal issues.114
Although an 1867 amendment to the Act omitted that limit,115 the Court in
Murdock v. City of Memphis116 declared that it would continue to follow this
practice.117 Murdock ruled that “[t]he State courts are the appropriate
tribunals . . . for the decision of questions arising under their local law,

108. See generally Nelson, 137 S. Ct. 1249.
109. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1924 (2003) (discussing the
“deeply embedded understanding that state-court determinations of state law in federal cases
are open to some reexamination by the Supreme Court; certainly so when, in Herbert
Wechsler’s language, the ‘existence, application or implementation of a federal right turns on
the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state law.’” (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of
Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977))).
110. See People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1249.
111. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1254.
112. See RICHARD H. FALLON JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 488–89 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the “interstitial nature of federal
law”).
113. See generally Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
114. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
115. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(2012)).
116. 87 U.S. 590 (1875).
117. Id. at 638.
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whether statutory or otherwise.”118 Six decades after Murdock, the policy
behind this holding was bolstered by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,119
which held that the source of authority for state law is the state’s own
lawmaking institutions—its legislature and its courts.120 In the ordinary case,
Supreme Court review of state law is thus incompatible with the Erie
principle. If Nelson were an ordinary case, the Court would take the Colorado
Supreme Court’s reading of the Exoneration Act as authoritative.
But Nelson was not an ordinary case because—when thoughtfully
considered—it brings into play an exception to the general Murdock rule.
The exception covers situations in which the state creates a right, and that
right then receives protection from federal law.121 In this type of case, the
state court’s ruling on the “antecedent” state ground holds the potential of, in
effect, denying the protection of a federal right to which the state right is
connected. In other words, “where a state law ruling serves as an antecedent
for determining whether a federal right has been violated, some review of the
basis for the state court’s determination of the state-law question is essential
if the federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimination.”122
A classic illustration of the doctrine is Indiana ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand.123 There, a public school teacher was fired despite a provision in state
law that, according to her reading, granted her a contract right against
termination at will.124 She sued on the theory that her dismissal violated the
Contract Clause of Article I of the Constitution, which forbids states from
impairing contractual obligations.125 The Indiana Supreme Court held that
under the state’s Teacher Tenure Act, because her contract was for only one
year at a time, she was not shielded from dismissal without cause.126 The
case falls into the “antecedent state ground” category because the putative
state right to continued employment was antecedent to the teacher’s
Contracts Clause claim.127 The Supreme Court explained:
On such a question, one primarily of state law, we accord respectful
consideration and great weight to the views of the State’s highest court but,
in order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we
are bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its
terms and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation,
impaired its obligation.128

Other cases describe the standard of review as asking whether the state
court’s ruling has “fair support” in state law.129 In Anderson, the Court
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 626.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 80.
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 112, at 487–88.
Id. at 488.
303 U.S. 95 (1938).
Id. at 97.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Anderson, 303 U.S. at 99–100.
Id.
Id.
See Monaghan, supra note 43, at 1924–25.
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examined the state law background and found that the statute that established
the teacher’s employment terms supported her position that the employment
relationship was contractual.130 A key reason was that “[u]ntil its decision in
the present case, the Supreme Court of Indiana had uniformly held that the
teacher’s right to continued employment by virtue of the indefinite contract
created pursuant to the act was contractual.”131 Having found insufficient
support for the Indiana court’s ruling against the teacher on the state law
contract issue, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Contracts Clause
applied.132
B. Nelson as an Exception
Fourteenth Amendment protection of state-created property rights falls
into the “antecedent state ground” category. As with the Contract Clause
issue in Anderson, state rights are antecedent to federal protection because
the rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause could be improperly
nullified by a state court’s ruling on the content of state-created property.133
When the Supreme Court considers a state-created property issue on review
from a state court decision, its role as the ultimate arbiter of federal law
justifies some examination of the state grounds to be sure that they meet the
“fair support” test.134 As a functional matter, a determination of whether one
has a state-law-based “property” interest for purposes of the Due Process
Clause is no different from a determination of whether one has a state-lawbased “contract” for purposes of the Contract Clause.135
The issue in Nelson could have been framed in these terms. The Colorado
court had found that the Exoneration Act provided the sole means for Nelson
and Madden to recover the money they had paid.136 That construction of the
statute provided the state law ground for the rejection of their claim to a
property interest in restoration under pre-Exoneration Act practice. As in
Anderson, the issue that brought Nelson to the Supreme Court was whether
that state law ruling had fair support in state law.137 On this issue, the state
court’s reasoning is key. Yet the Colorado court’s treatment of the impact of
the Exoneration Act consists of two sentences:
[A] court may not intrude on the General Assembly’s power by authorizing
a refund from public funds without statutory authority to do so. The
Exoneration Act provides the sole statutory authority for the court to issue
a refund to criminal defendants after their convictions are overturned.138

130. Anderson, 303 U.S. at 109.
131. Id. at 105.
132. Id. at 99.
133. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 121, at 509.
134. See Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Tr. Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944).
135. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 121, at 514–16.
136. See People v. Madden, 364 P.3d 866, 868 (Colo. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Nelson v.
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017); People v. Nelson, 362 P.3d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 2015), rev’d,
137 S. Ct. 1249.
137. See generally Nelson, 137 S. Ct. 1249.
138. Nelson, 362 P.3d at 1075–76.
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Beyond these two sentences, the Colorado court did not discuss the terms of
the statute, its legislative history, or the context under which it was
enacted.139
To be sure, Nelson did not litigate the issue of whether this state law ruling
found adequate support in state law.140 Curiously, however, her Supreme
Court brief pointed to a promising argument that such “fair support” did not
exist.141 The brief described the state law background of restoration in
Colorado and elsewhere, including the Exoneration Act.142 The brief noted
the widely recognized rule that “[a] party who has paid money pursuant to a
judgment has always been entitled to a refund when the judgment is
reversed.”143 It added—without any dispute from the state144—that “[u]ntil
this case, Colorado followed the traditional rule.”145 Then, in a critical
passage, the brief showed that the Exoneration Act was not conceived or
enacted with the aim of overturning settled practice.146
Instead, Nelson argued that the Act’s “immediate impetus” was to deal
with the case of a man who served eighteen years for a murder he did not
commit before being exonerated by DNA evidence.147 The statute was
“supported equally by prosecutors and defense lawyers”148 and designed to
cover only a narrow range of cases.149 Thus, “[a] representative of the
Colorado Attorney General’s office testified that the legislation was
‘narrowly defined’ and that it would not apply to defendants who ‘are just
acquitted after trial’ or those ‘who have their convictions reversed after
appeal based on a procedural or a legal error.’”150 The Colorado State
General Assembly thus estimated that “compensation . . . would be awarded
to only one defendant every five years.”151 The bill passed the Colorado
House by a 60-to-2 vote and passed the Senate unanimously, all of which
Nelson documented in her brief.152 In its own brief, Colorado did not
challenge any of these assertions.153
In addition to ignoring the legislative history, the Colorado court’s reading
of the Exoneration Act is hard to square with the terms of the Act, which
provide that only certain individuals convicted of a crime may pursue
139. Id.
140. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 53.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2.
144. See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 54.
145. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 53, at 3.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 4.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added) (quoting Recording of Hearing Before the Colorado
Senate Judiciary Committee on HB 13-1230 (Apr. 24, 2013), http://coloradoga.granicus.com/
MediaPlayer.php?view_id=47&clip_id=3854&meta_id=66420
[https://perma.cc/WH7928PD] (recording at 1:47:58)).
151. Id. at 5; see also Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1260 (2017) (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
152. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 53, at 5.
153. See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 54.
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relief.154 The statute applies only to “a person who has been convicted of a
felony . . . and sentenced to a term of incarceration . . . and has served all or
part of such sentence.”155 These limits jibe with the legislative history but
make no sense under the Colorado court’s broader reading of the statute. If
the statute were the sole authorization for refunds, why would payments be
available only to persons convicted of felonies and not misdemeanors, only
to persons sentenced to incarceration, and only to persons who have served
part of the sentence of incarceration?
Having demolished the Colorado Supreme Court’s rationale, the
petitioners might have gone on to invoke the principle of Anderson. They
could have argued, in the most powerful way, that the Colorado court’s ruling
against them rested on an inadequate state ground because its Exoneration
Act rationale did not have fair support in state law. They evidently preferred
to treat the Colorado Supreme Court’s construction of the Exoneration Act
as the final word on state law and to instead advance a due process
argument.156 Since they won anyway, it may seem churlish to criticize that
choice. And it may be unfair to fault the Supreme Court for failing to opt for
a rationale that was never briefed or argued.
Still, there were good reasons for the Court to take the “antecedent state
ground” approach to Nelson. One of its main advantages is that it avoids any
need for the Court to rely (even if implicitly) on a controversial “natural
property” line of analysis.157 A recognition that pre-Exoneration Act
principles continued to govern Nelson’s case would have permitted the Court
to rely squarely on the Roth state-created-property line of cases. After all,
even Colorado’s lawyers relied solely on the Exoneration Act in their brief
to the Court, a strategy that seems to implicitly concede that Nelson had a
right to secure a refund under state law so long as pre-Exoneration Act law
was operative.158 By avoiding the Court’s ad hoc definition of Fourteenth
Amendment “property,” the antecedent state ground route would contribute
to coherence in constitutional law.
In addition, the “antecedent state ground” approach is more flexible than
the Court’s method. I suggested earlier that the majority’s rationale may not
admit the equitable exception illustrated by Noel.159 State-created property
has no difficulty accounting for such exceptions. For example, government
jobs and other benefits are typically subject to conditions, notably that an
employee can be fired “for cause” or that a business license may be forfeited
for violation of safety regulations.160 Finally, as Part III discusses, the statecreated-property approach puts the property interest on a footing that is
analytically distinct from the “liberty” protected by the Due Process

154. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-102(1)(a) (2017).
155. Id.
156. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 53.
157. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 943 (“It is probably too late in the day to adopt such a
natural-property strategy.”).
158. See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 54.
159. See supra Part I.B.
160. See supra note 77 (citing cases).
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Clause.161 Thus, a state-created-property approach does not depend on the
Court’s unconvincing distinction between “property” and “liberty.”162
A downside of the “antecedent state ground” approach, at least from a
property protection point of view, is that it permits a state to do away with
restoration if that is its preference. In particular, a state legislature could
enact a statute exactly like the Exoneration Act, with an express declaration
in the act itself that it provided the sole basis for postexoneration recovery.
A state court opinion that implemented such a statute would (to say the least)
not lack “fair support” in state law. And many observers would find this
result troubling precisely because it seems not at all “natural” for the state to
keep money it acquired from persons it has invalidly convicted.163
One answer to this objection is that democratic values should count for
something in the definition of “property” for purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment protection. Given the generally light constitutional scrutiny of
property regulation,164 it seems appropriate to recognize that a
democratically elected legislature may decide to reject refunds. In any case,
the objection is mainly theoretical. In practice, democratic values seem to
favor the right to refund, as it enjoys wide support throughout the nation.165
It is hard to find critics of the Supreme Court’s holding in Nelson. Colorado’s
experience is instructive. Indeed, after the Colorado Supreme Court’s
decision in Nelson, the Colorado legislature enacted a statute that generally
authorized restoration.166
Colorado’s enactment of this statute supports the view that the Colorado
court misread the Exoneration Act. In addition, the new statute may help to
explain Justice Ginsburg’s cavalier treatment of Fourteenth Amendment
property doctrine.167 Since other jurisdictions already allow refunds,168 and
since Colorado will do so in the future under the new statute,169 the holding
will have little impact on the basic issue of whether refunds are available.
The Court may have viewed Nelson as an occasion for doing nothing more
than correcting an injustice in the case at hand.170 But its “natural” property
rationale now lies ready for use—and the creation of still more confusion—
in future litigation.
III. PROPERTY AND LIBERTY
Nelson was an unusual case because states generally refund most payments
made pursuant to nullified convictions.171 But the Due Process Clause
161. See infra Part III.
162. See infra Part III.
163. See Post, supra note 4, at 209.
164. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 943–44.
165. See supra note 4 (citing state statutes).
166. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-603 (2018).
167. See supra Part I.A.
168. See supra note 4 (citing state statutes).
169. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-603.
170. The Court took note of the new statute in a footnote. See Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S.
Ct. 1259, 1254 n.4 (2017).
171. See supra note 4 (citing state statutes).
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protects liberty as well as property.172 Besides imposing fines and other
charges, states typically lock people up upon conviction and do not
compensate them for their loss of liberty if and when their convictions are
dislodged.173 In Nelson, the Court held that in the property context, “[t]o
comport with due process, a State may not impose anything more than
minimal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction
subsequently invalidated.”174 How does this reasoning apply to liberty?
The very core of Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” is “freedom from
personal restraint.”175 And, broadly speaking, modern Supreme Court
doctrine systematically accords far greater constitutional protection to liberty
in this essential form than to interests in property.176 The question thus arises,
If due process requires nothing more than “minimal procedures” to vindicate
through monetary recovery the deprivation of one’s property, why should it
require anything more to vindicate, through a monetary recovery, the
deprivation of one’s liberty? To be sure, recognition of such an obligation
would potentially impose far greater costs on state governments than the
property holding in Nelson. And the current Supreme Court surely will not
extend Nelson to cover liberty. In fact, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the
Court gives no reason to think that even a more liberal Court would do so.
But as a matter of constitutional principle and doctrine, why should it not?
This Part begins with a discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to
distinguish between property and liberty in her majority opinion in Nelson.
It next discusses the alternative, historical-perspective approach advocated
for by Justice Alito in concurrence and considers whether relying on history
and tradition was the better approach to addressing the plaintiff’s claim in
Nelson.
A. Distinguishing Liberty and Property in Nelson
The three opinions in Nelson give three different reasons for not requiring
states to compensate for lost liberty. In his dissent, Justice Thomas declined
to distinguish between liberty and property.177 His view was that Nelson and
Madden had no constitutional right to recover anything.178 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Alito cited the general principle that “historical practice is
probative of whether a procedural rule can be characterized as
172. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
173. See Teressa E. Ravenell, Cause and Conviction: The Role of Causation in § 1983
Wrongful Conviction Claims, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 689, 691 (2008) (“Although wrongful
convictions may be an inevitable consequence of our criminal justice system, it would seem
that a person wrongly deprived of his liberty is entitled to a civil remedy to compensate for
the mistakes of the criminal system. Yet persons wrongly convicted . . . are often denied
monetary compensation.”).
174. Nelson, 137 S. Ct at 1258.
175. See Monaghan, supra note 43, at 411.
176. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–66 (1973) (striking down a state law that
criminalized abortion), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
474 (1987) (upholding a Pennsylvania law prohibiting coal mining that caused underground
damage to an existing building).
177. See Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1263 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
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fundamental.”179 Building on this principle, he emphasized that, as a matter
of historical practice, states routinely refund money while not compensating
for lost liberty, except in exceptional circumstances.180 Thus, “history and
tradition” operated to support a distinction between property and liberty in
this setting.181
The majority took a different tack. Colorado had argued that “if the
Exoneration Act provides sufficient process to compensate a defendant for
the loss of her liberty, the Act should also suffice [for loss of her
property].”182 But Justice Ginsburg rejected the property/liberty link on the
ground that an act of restoration by the state differs fundamentally from an
act of compensation by the state.183 As she explained:
The comparison [suggested by Colorado] is inapt. Nelson and Madden
seek restoration of funds they paid to the State, not compensation for
temporary deprivation of those funds. Petitioners seek only their money
back, not interest on those funds for the period the funds were in the State’s
custody. Just as the restoration of liberty on reversal of a conviction is not
compensation, neither is the return of money taken by the State on account
of the conviction.184

Under scrutiny, this property/liberty distinction seems to dissolve.
Restoration of funds is the functional equivalent of compensation. That
restoration, after all, is what makes the plaintiff whole.185 The Court stressed
that Nelson and Madden did not seek interest on the money, which means
that they were not made completely whole.186 But the interest was a minor
matter—the tiny tail of the dog when it came to compensating these
defendants for their losses.
The final sentence of Ginsburg’s passage quoted above both falsely
equates the restoration of liberty with the restoration of property and confuses
two senses of the term “restoration.”187 As to the first point, money can be
reduced to a physical object so that an order requiring the state to return
money will make the plaintiff almost whole. Liberty, by contrast, is an
experience. When someone is confined, their experience of liberty is lost
forever. One might attempt to distinguish liberty and property on the ground
that the state is enriched when it deprives a person of property but not when
it deprives a person of liberty. But that distinction fails in this context
because the Due Process Clause focuses on what happens to the “person”

179. Id. at 1258 (Alito, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 1258–63.
181. Id. at 1261.
182. Id. at 1257 (majority opinion).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Leading Case, Nelson v. Colorado, 131 HARV. L. REV. 283, 287 (2017) (“Nelson’s
central problem is why the petitioner’s substantive entitlement to a refund is different from an
entitlement to compensation for wrongful imprisonment.”); cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 668 (1974) (holding, in the context of upholding a state Eleventh Amendment immunity
defense, that restitution is the functional equivalent to compensatory damages).
186. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257.
187. Id. at 1258.
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who is “deprive[d],” not what happens to the state.188 One might even
imagine a world in which money paid to the state as fines or fees pursuant to
conviction is immediately destroyed by the state. In such a case, the state is
not enriched. Even so, for Due Process Clause purposes there is still a
deprivation of “property”—just as surely as there is a deprivation of liberty
when a defendant is placed behind bars.
As to the second point, the Court’s “just as” comparison lumps together
two distinct senses in which “restoration” can occur. Restoration of liberty
signifies only that liberty is no longer being taken—not that one is getting
back the lost liberty. The Court correctly points out that “restoration of
liberty on reversal of a conviction is not compensation.”189 But the Court is
mistaken when it asserts that “the return of money” is not compensation.190
In every functional sense it is, and that is true regardless of academic
hairsplitting about the distinction between the “return” of the money, on the
one hand, and “compensation” through the payment of interest, on the other.
It is beside the point that no interest was paid. The essential purpose of
making a payment equivalent to the amount of fees and fines is to compensate
the plaintiff for the (now found to be erroneous) extraction of those amounts
from the plaintiff.
B. An Appeal to History and Tradition: Nelson Reconsidered
In light of all of this, the Court would have done far better to rely on history
and tradition, as Justice Alito suggested.191 This suggestion may seem
wrongheaded, and its shortcomings must be acknowledged. In many
situations, a strictly historical rationale for a rule is vulnerable to the
objection that it favors the status quo, even when there are compelling
reasons for change. And there surely are good reasons of constitutional
principle for requiring governments to compensate defendants for
confinement when their convictions are overturned. In these cases, the state
has deprived a person of constitutionally protected liberty for a reason now
shown to be unsound. If an appellate reversal provides a sufficiently strong
ground to oblige states to pay for property deprivations, as Nelson holds, then
a strong a fortiori argument for requiring similar payments for liberty
deprivations surely exists.
Justice Ginsburg’s “natural property” approach unwittingly adds force to
the case for compensation. As discussed, she seems to treat the Fourteenth
Amendment as the source of property rights, just as the Court has
traditionally done with liberty.192 Her analysis thus seems to place the two
rights on the same footing. And if property and liberty have the same Due
Process Clause source, it becomes more difficult to see why they should not
enjoy the same Due Process Clause protection. Nelson holds that property

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1257.
See id. at 1252.
See id. at 1258–63 (Alito, J., concurring).
See supra Part I.B.
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loss triggers the right to a remedy pursuant to “minimal procedures.”193 Why
should liberty not get the same protection? If the Due Process Clause creates
a property right for Nelson to be restored to the status quo ante when her
conviction is overturned, it seems sensible to say that the Due Process Clause
likewise creates a liberty right to be restored to the status quo ante.
The “history and tradition” rationale fares much better if liberty and
property are kept separate, as they are under Roth,194 a case in which the
Court drew a sharp distinction between the Fourteenth Amendment content
of property and of liberty.195 Property interests are created by state or federal
statutory and common law and practice.196 But Roth “outlined distinctively
different methodologies for identifying constitutional liberty and
property.”197 In describing the source and scope of Fourteenth Amendment
“liberty,” the Court did not turn to state law. Instead, it cited Meyer v.
Nebraska,198 a substantive due process decision.199 According to Meyer,
liberty
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry . . . and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.200

The Court’s post-Meyer body of case law on “liberty” treats the Due Process
Clause as the source of these rights.201
Under the Roth approach, “history and tradition” are not just boilerplate
arguments for the status quo.202 They provide viable doctrinal grounds for
continued adherence to the rule that the Due Process Clause does not entitle
defendants to compensation for confinement pending appeal.203 The
criminal procedure may provide sufficient process to justify the deprivation
of liberty, so long as that process is not tainted by the constitutional or
common law tort of malicious prosecution.204 By contrast, under Roth, the
content of Nelson and Madden’s property right is defined differently.205 It
depends on legitimate expectations formed by reliance on state or federal
statutory law, common law, and the policies and practices of institutions.206
193. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1258 (majority opinion).
194. See generally Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
195. Compare Monaghan, supra note 43, at 411–34 (discussing liberty), with id. at 434–44
(discussing property).
196. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005).
197. Merrill, supra note 40, at 919.
198. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
199. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
200. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
201. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 919.
202. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
203. See id.
204. Cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1979) (holding that a person confined
for three days on account of mistaken identity, but pursuant to a valid warrant, is deprived of
“liberty,” but the deprivation is not “without due process of law”).
205. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
206. Id.
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The general practice, including pre-Exoneration Act practice in Colorado,
was to refund much of the money exacted from the defendant upon
conviction.207 Based on this practice, Nelson and Madden can claim a statecreated property right to a refund. As for the impact of the Exoneration Act,
the Colorado court’s reading of it lacks fair support in Colorado law.208 The
Supreme Court should have ruled that it is not an adequate state law ground
for the holding against Nelson and Madden.
The tradition of distinguishing between liberty and property in the
“restoration” context probably reflects a pragmatic judgment that the cost of
compensation for lost liberty would be much higher than paying for fees and
fines. If that judgment clashes with the maxim that a remedy should be
available for every violation of a constitutional right,209 the maxim must give
way in the face of reality. As Daryl Levinson has shown, “the actual practice
of constitutional law” is that “[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for
their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very
existence.”210 Building on the work of Levinson and others, Richard Fallon
has developed the “Equilibration Thesis,” which “holds that courts, and
especially the Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard as
an acceptable overall alignment of doctrines involving justiciability,
substantive rights, and available remedies.”211 None of this settles the issue
of whether persons in Nelson’s place should have a remedy for their lost
liberty. But the Equilibration Thesis does suggest that if a remedy is too
costly it will not be made available.212 Thus, a distinction between property
and liberty claims is broadly consistent with the general principles governing
the relations between rights and remedies in our system.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s analysis is limited to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nelson.
It is not a comprehensive treatment of issues raised by “liberty” and
“property” claims in other contexts, including “restoration” cases. It also
fails to examine two other avenues of relief that may have been available to
the plaintiff in Nelson. First, Nelson’s procedural due process reasoning does
not apply to a claim that a statute like the Exoneration Act—one enacted with
the avowed aim of denying restoration—would violate substantive due
process.
In that context, constitutional property may be defined
differently,213 and Roth would not control. The Court may define property
without regard to the entitlements created by state law, strike down the
207. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 53, at 2–3.
208. See supra Part II.
209. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury.”).
210. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1999).
211. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 637 (2006).
212. See id. at 649–52.
213. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 893, 955–60.
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hypothesized statute as an arbitrary exercise of the state’s legislative power,
and distinguish “liberty” on grounds of history and tradition.
Second, and relatedly, Colorado’s refusal to return the money may amount
to a “taking,” such that the state would be obliged to return it under the
Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence.214 The important point here is that
the Court’s ruling in Nelson itself raised far more questions than it answered.
In later cases, more than the Court seemed to realize, it will have no choice
but to deal with the complex problems lurking beneath the surface of the
Nelson opinion.

214. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

